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INTRODUCTION 
The law distinguishes between an undocumented alien worker’s 
right to economic damages stemming from termination of his unlawful 
employment and his right to certain non-economic damages incurred 
during such prohibited activities—particularly compensation for injuries 
suffered during the course of unlawful employment. Under the federal 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”),
1
 economic damages, 
such as back or front pay, are unavailable to aliens unlawfully present in 
the United States who procured their employment in violation of the 
IRCA.
2
 On the federal level, these individuals do not have authorization 
to work and consequently have no lawful entitlement to unemployment 
or wage benefits. However, New Jersey permits undocumented alien 
workers to recover non-economic damages under its statewide Workers’ 
Compensation scheme, despite the fact that such individuals are not 
authorized to work in the United States.
3
 
Although the Supreme Court held that undocumented alien 
workers
4
 are not entitled to back pay when they experience wrongful 
termination under the federal National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) 
 
1 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (ICRA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324c 
(2013). 
2 Davila v. Grimes, No. 2:09-CV-407, 2010 WL 1737121, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 
2010) (declining to decide on motion to compel, but determining that immigration status is 
relevant to claim for lost wages in tort action). 
3 Many state courts, including those in New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New 
Hampshire, and, most recently, in Delaware and the District of Columbia, have found that 
the IRCA does not preempt state law on lost wages in workers’ compensation cases. See, 
e.g., Asylum Co. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 10 A.3d 619, 632–33 (D.C. 2010). 
4 The term “unlawfully present alien” is considered by some to be synonymous with 
“illegal alien,” though the latter has a more pejorative ring and is therefore not being 
employed herein. For purposes of this article, it may be more accurate to describe the group 
as “non-citizens unauthorized to work,” though this phrase is a bit too unwieldy to include 
throughout. 
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because of their lack of work authorization in the first instance, 
undocumented workers in the state of New Jersey maintain access to the 
statewide Workers’ Compensation scheme if they suffer from work-
related injuries. Unlike the NLRA, which creates independent causes of 
action for those employees falling under its umbrella, New Jersey 
Workers’ Compensation is a statutory scheme utilized in part as a 
substitute for civil lawsuits to which everyone would traditionally have 
access regardless of immigration status.
5
 Thus, undocumented alien 
workers have access to workers’ compensation benefits just as they 
would have access to civil remedies in courts of law. Although New 
Jersey grants undocumented alien workers access to Workers’ 
Compensation Courts despite their lack of authority to work in the 
United States, the state does not extend economic remuneration, such as 
unemployment benefits, to these workers. This Article explains the 
unlawfully present alien’s access to New Jersey’s Workers’ 
Compensation Courts—and not economic programs, such as 
unemployment benefits—and the basis for allowing an unlawfully 
present alien to pursue certain work-related injury claims under New 
Jersey Law.
6
 
I. Background on the Immigration Reform and Control Act
7
 
Immigration law falls exclusively within the federal domain.
8
 The 
authority to admit or exclude non-citizens from the United States is a 
fundamentally sovereign act.
9
 The statutory and regulatory schemes 
governing immigration law are found at the federal level. The 
Immigration Reform and Control Act is a “comprehensive scheme 
 
5 Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d 221, 225 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1996). 
6 The issue of temporary disability compensation and undocumented alien workers is 
not addressed in this Article, but it is important to note that such benefits are an additional 
way for undocumented alien workers to seek compensation from employers. The extent of 
undocumented alien workers’ access to such benefits is beyond the scope of this piece. 
Anecdotally, it appears that many undocumented alien workers would have trouble 
accessing such benefits due to the fact that it is common for them to be paid in cash, and 
proof of wages is one essential element of temporary disability compensation claims. 
7 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a–1324c (2006). 
8 C.f. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (“Nor can federal power over illegal immigration be deemed 
exclusive because of what the Court’s opinion solicitously calls ‘foreign countries[’] 
concern[s] about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States.”).  
9 Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 
705 (1893); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). 
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prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States.”
10
 
The IRCA “forcefully” made combating the employment of 
unlawfully present aliens central to “[t]he policy of immigration law.”
11
 
It did so by establishing an extensive employment verification system
12
 
designed to deny employment to aliens who (a) are not lawfully present 
in the United States, or (b) are not lawfully authorized to work in the 
United States.
13
 This verification system is critical to the IRCA regime. 
To enforce it, the IRCA mandates that employers verify the identity and 
eligibility of all new hires by examining specified documents before 
they begin work.
14
 If an alien applicant is unable to present the required 
documentation, he cannot be hired.
15
 Furthermore, it is a crime under the 
IRCA for an alien to undermine the employer verification system by 
using or attempting to use “any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely 
made document” or “any document lawfully issued to or with respect to 
a person other than the possessor” for purposes of obtaining 
employment in the United States.
16
 Violation of the IRCA can result in 
fines, incarceration, or both for the alien offender.
17
 Similarly, 
employers may be subject to significant civil money penalties and even 
criminal sanctions for knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens.
18
 
Employers that unknowingly hire an unauthorized alien, or later 
discover that the alien has lost his lawful status during employment, 
must immediately discharge that employee.
19
 
 
 
10 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 147 
(2002) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a). The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari on other 
cases on this issue. Cont’l Pet Techs., Inc. v. Palacias, 546 U.S. 825 (2005); Vaughan 
Roofing & Sheet Metal, LLC v. Rodriguez, 131 S. Ct. 1572 (2011).  
11 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 
U.S. 183, 194 n.8 (1991). 
12 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2006). 
13 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)(2006). 
14 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(2006). 
15 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(2006). 
16 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324c(a)(1)–(3)(2006). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2013). 
18 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(e)(5), 1324a(f)(1)(2006). 
19 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2)(2006). 
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II. The Supreme Court on Economic Remedies to 
Undocumented Alien Workers Based on Labor Law 
Violations: Hoffman Plastic Compounds 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations 
Board is the most recent U.S. Supreme Court case to address the rights 
of undocumented workers pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act 
in light of the broad restrictions of the IRCA.
20
 The case arose in the 
context of an action contesting an order of the National Labor Relations 
Board (hereinafter “Board”) awarding back pay to an undocumented 
worker in response to his improper termination under the NLRA.
21
 
Castro, the undocumented alien worker, originally secured employment 
via the use of fraudulent documents, a criminal act under the IRCA.
22
 
The offending employer fired Castro because he supported a union-
organizing effort, a violation of the NLRA.
23
 As a result of its violation 
of the NLRA, Hoffman was ordered by the Board to award back pay to 
Castro from the date of improper termination to the date Hoffman 
learned of Castro’s undocumented status.
24
 The Hoffman Court stated 
that it was being asked to permit an “award [of] backpay [sic] to an 
illegal alien for years of work not performed, for wages that could not 
lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the first instance by 
a criminal fraud.”
25
 The Court ultimately held “that awarding backpay 
[sic] to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies 
the Board has no authority to enforce or administer.”
26
 
The Supreme Court further concluded that “allowing the Board to 
award backpay [sic] to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit 
statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as 
expressed in IRCA. It would encourage the successful evasion of 
apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of 
the immigration laws, and encourage future violations.”
27
 
The IRCA and Hoffman were later relied upon by lower courts to 
deny undocumented workers the right to seek alternative remedies for 
 
20 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137. 
21 Id. at 140. 
22 Id. at 141. 
23 Id. at 140. 
24 Id. at 141–42. 
25 Id. at 148–49, 159–60. 
26 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149. 
27 Id. at 151. 
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other employment-related wrongful conduct, such as workplace 
discrimination. In Crespo v. Evergo Corp.,
28
 the plaintiff, a former 
employee and an undocumented alien worker, claimed that Evergo 
refused to permit her to return to work after going on maternity leave.
29
 
The New Jersey Appellate Division held that an undocumented alien 
who gained employment using fraudulent documentation was 
disqualified from legal employment and thus is ineligible for economic 
or non-economic recovery (i.e., back pay and reinstatement to her 
former position, respectively) under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination (“LAD”).
30
 The court made clear that Crespo’s claims 
arose solely from her wrongful termination and not from any 
mistreatment during the course of her employment.
31
 In reconciling the 
facial disconnect between the IRCA and the LAD, the court noted that, 
although the LAD provides that all persons have the right to be 
employed without fear of discrimination, the LAD also allows an 
employer to “‘restrict employment to citizens of the United States 
where such restriction is required by federal law. . . .’”
32
 
While Hoffman and Crespo deny undocumented workers the right 
to recover economic and non-economic damages under the LAD and 
the NLRA, these cases do not leave workers without any state and 
federal workplace rights, including the right to receive workers’ 
compensation benefits after suffering a job-related injury or illness. 
III. An Undocumented Worker’s Right to Personal Injury 
Damages 
“Each person is entitled to the equal protection of the law” and 
“every alien, whether in this country legally or not, has a right to sue 
those who physically injure him.”
33
 The principal goal of damages in 
personal-injury actions is to compensate fairly the injured party.
34
 Fair 
 
28 Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
29 Id. at 472. 
30 Id. at 477; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5–1. 
31 Crespo, 841 A.2d at 477. 
32 Id. at 474 (quoting § 10:5–12(a) (West 2013)). 
33 Hagl v. Jacob Stern & Sons, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 779, 784 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citing 
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641–42 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 
371 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356 (1886)). 
34 Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 475 A.2d 648, 652 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 
1984). 
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compensatory damages resulting from the tortious infliction of injury 
encompass no more than the amount that will make the plaintiff whole, 
that is, the actual loss.
35
 “The purpose, then [,] of personal injury 
compensation is neither to reward the plaintiff, nor to punish the 
defendant, but to replace plaintiff’s losses.”
36
 
New Jersey case law regarding the universal right to access the 
courts for civil remedies generally provides the key to understanding the 
basis for granting workers’ compensation to undocumented alien 
workers. New Jersey courts have long held “‘that illegal aliens have 
rights of access to the courts and are eligible to sue therein to enforce 
contracts and redress civil wrongs such as negligently inflicted personal 
injuries.’”
37
 The New Jersey Appellate Division has held that “a well 
established body of law holds that illegal aliens have rights of access to 
the courts and are eligible to sue therein to enforce contracts and redress 
civil wrongs such as negligently inflicted personal injuries.”
38
 The New 
Jersey Appellate Division reaffirmed this sentiment even after the 1996 
IRCA immigration reforms.
39
 Other post-Hoffman courts have also 
attempted to reconcile the IRCA with the availability of workers’ 
compensation and personal injury economic damages.
40
 
The highest federal court to address an instance of personal injury 
of an undocumented alien worker is the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Madeira v. Affordable Housing Fund, Inc.
41
 That court heard 
an appeal from a jury verdict in a personal injury action under New 
York state law awarding compensatory damages for lost earnings to an 
undocumented alien worker, as well as out-of-pocket expenses and pain 
and suffering.
42
 Madeira distinguished the holding in Hoffman, noting 
that “the injury being remedied in Hoffman Plastic was termination 
while the wrong being compensated in this case is disabling personal 
 
35 Ruff v. Weintraub, 519 A.2d 1384, 1386 (N.J. 1987) (citing Tenore v. Nu Car 
Carriers, 341 A.2d 613, 619 (N.J. 1975)). 
36 See Domeracki, supra note 38.  
37 Crespo, 841 A.2d at 476 (quoting Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 
1103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)). 
38 Montoya, 401 A.2d at 103–04 (citations omitted). 
39 Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 225 (citing Montoya, 401 A.2d at 103–04) (“We fully 
subscribe to that proposition.”). 
40 See Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 239 n. 21 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
41 Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006). 
42 Id. 
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injury.”
43
 Generally, for public policy reasons, undocumented workers 
who are injured on the job should be eligible to recover lost wages when 
the employer is at fault. Where “(1) the wrong being compensated is 
personal injury, conduct not authorized by IRCA; (2) it was the 
employer and not the worker who [knowingly] violated IRCA by 
arranging for the employment; and (3) the jury was instructed to 
consider the worker’s removability in assessing damages,” New York 
could, consistent with the IRCA, allow an injured worker to be 
compensated with lost earnings at United States pay rates.
44
 
Following Madeira, the court in Hocza v. City of New York 
determined lost wages were recoverable in a negligence claim, stating 
“neither [Madeira nor Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC] held that a claim 
for lost earnings by an undocumented alien should be treated differently 
than such a claim ‘by any other injured person.’”
45
 The court in Hocza 
concluded that a plaintiff’s immigration status could not be introduced 
for the possibility that he would be deported, but it could be used to 
address its “impact on opportunities for employment in the United 
States.”
46
 
Although not precedential, it should be noted that, in 2011, the 
U.S. District Court for New Jersey, in Kalyta v. Versa Products,
47
 an 
unpublished case, held that an undocumented worker may seek damages 
for lost wages in connection with a personal injury suit. Kalyta initially 
entered the United States on a student visa but, instead of going to 
school, he went to work at a satellite dish installation company where he 
was injured after falling from a ladder while on the job.
48
 He sued the 
ladder manufacturer and related sales entities for personal injuries and 
lost wages due to his inability to work as a result of his injuries.
49
 Unlike 
in Hoffman, this was not a suit by an employee against his employer, 
and there were no allegations that Kalyta gained employment by use of 
fraudulent documents. The court noted that Crespo had previously held 
 
43 Id. at 236. 
44 Id. at 223, 228. 
45 Hocza v. City of New York, No. 06–3340, 2009 WL 124701, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 
2009) (referencing Madiera, 469 F.3d 219 and Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 
1246 (N.Y. 2006). 
46 Id. 
47 Kalyta v. Versa Prods., No. 07-1333 (MLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27719 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 17, 2011). 
48 Id. at *2. 
49 Id. at *3. 
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that “where the governing workplace statutory scheme makes legal 
employment a prerequisite to its remedial benefits, a worker’s illegal 
alien status will bar relief thereunder.”
50
 The court also noted the 
absence of any New Jersey authority creating such a prerequisite for the 
recovery of lost wages in a personal injury action. Accordingly, the 
court held that “neither IRCA nor New Jersey law prohibits lost wages 
damages for undocumented workers in the personal injury tort 
context.”
51
 
IV. The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, Work Injury 
Claims, and the “Intentional Wrong” Caveat 
Workers’ Compensation is a state insurance program designed to 
provide compensation to employees who suffer job-related injuries or 
illness. In New Jersey, the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”) 
provides that “[w]hen personal injury is caused to an employee by 
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, of which 
the actual or lawfully imputed negligence of the employer is the natural 
and proximate cause, he shall receive compensation therefor [sic] from 
his employer. . . .”
52
 The WCA also provides that the parties’ use of the 
statute 
shall be a surrender by the [employer and employee] of their rights to 
any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination 
thereof than as provided in this article and an acceptance of all of the 
provisions of [the Workers’ Compensation Act], and shall bind the 
employee. . . as well as the employer. . . .
53
 
There are three types of benefits to which workers are entitled 
under New Jersey’s WCA: medical, temporary disability, and 
permanent disability.
54
 Medical benefits compensate the worker for 
expenses paid for medical treatment to treat or cure the injury.
55
 If an 
injury produces a temporary disability, the worker is eligible to receive 
seventy percent of his or her wages at the time of the injury, subject to a 
 
50 Id. at *19 (quoting Crespo, 841 A.2d at 476). 
51 Kalyta, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27719, at *20. 
52 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15–1 (West 2013). 
53 § 34:15–8. 
54 Many attorneys list an additional benefit: reopener rights. This is the ability to seek 
additional benefits within two years of the last payment received if the worker’s injury 
becomes worse than initially projected. This benefit is distinct from the others in that it is 
not an immediate, monetary benefit resulting from an initial claim. § 34:15–27. 
55 § 34:15–15. 
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certain statutory minimum and maximum, for up to 400 weeks.
56
 For a 
permanent and total disability, a worker may receive seventy percent of 
his or her wages at the time of the injury, subject to statutory 
limitations, for 450 weeks.
57
 To receive benefits for longer than 450 
weeks, the worker must demonstrate continued injury.
58
 For partial, 
permanent disability, a worker is entitled to seventy percent of wages 
for a period, to be paid in accordance with the Disability Wage and 
Compensation Schedule embodied in the Act.
59
 
New Jersey case law further supports that the WCA creates an 
exclusive remedy for employees who sustain injuries arising in and out 
of the course of their employment.
60
 “It is the plain, unambiguous 
language of the statute itself . . . which clearly demonstrates that 
Workers’ Compensation is the exclusive remedy afforded to the 
employee who is injured during the course of his employment.”
61
 The 
WCA embodies “an [sic] historic ‘trade-off’ whereby employees 
relinquish their right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for 
prompt and automatic entitlement to benefits for work-related 
injuries.”
62
 “If an injury . . . is compensable under [the WCA], a person 
shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of 
such injury . . . except for intentional wrong.”
63
 Thus, even if an 
undocumented worker recovers damages under the WCA scheme, he is 
likely stuck with those benefits as the exclusive remedy. He may only 
recover further in court if he can get beyond the statute’s exclusivity 
provision and establish that the injury meets the high bar of being an 
“intentional wrong.” 
A plaintiff—any plaintiff, regardless of immigration status—
claiming such an “intentional wrong” bears a high burden of proof 
 
56 § 34:15–12(a). 
57 § 34:15–12(b). 
58 Id. 
59 § 34:15–12(c). 
60 Part of Title 34 Chapter 15 of the New Jersey statutes is the New Jersey Workers’ 
Compensation Act. §§ 34:15-1 to –142 (2012). 
61 DeFigueiredo v. U.S. Metals Refining Co., 563 A.2d 76, 78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1988), aff ’d, 563 A.2d 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). 
62 Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 790 A.2d 884, 886 (N.J. 2002) (citing Millison v. E. I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1985)); see also Seltzer v. Isaacson, 
371 A.2d 304, 307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). 
63 § 34:15–8 (emphasis added). The New Jersey Supreme Court explained the nature of 
“intentional wrong” in this context in Millison. Millison, 501 A.2d at 509–10. 
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requiring a showing of a deliberate intent to injure.
64
 The Supreme Court 
of New Jersey in Millison v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. held that, 
in order to show intentional wrong on the part of the employer, the 
plaintiff must show that there was both (1) conduct that amounts to 
substantial certainty of harm, well beyond negligence or recklessness, 
and (2) a context in which the injury or illness is “plainly beyond 
anything the legislature could have contemplated as entitling the 
employee to recover only under the [WCA],” excluding risks that are 
inherent in the industrial industry.
65
 The court clarified that: 
[e]ven if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence, 
and includes such elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous 
work condition to exist, knowingly ordering [a] claimant to perform 
an extremely dangerous job, willfully failing to furnish a safe place 
to work, or even willfully or unlawfully violating a safety statute, 
this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs 
the injury of accidental character.
66
 
Noting that the Workers’ Compensation system “confronts head-on the 
unpleasant, even harsh, reality . . . that industry knowingly exposes 
workers to the risks of injury and disease . . . . The essential question 
[that must be answered is] what level of risk-exposure is so egregious as 
to constitute an ‘intentional wrong.’”
67
 
Mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk does not constitute 
intent. The New Jersey Appellate Division, in analyzing this issue, 
concluded that “if the risk is great [,] the conduct may be characterized 
as reckless or wanton, but it is not an intentional wrong.”
68
 “[A]n 
intentional wrong is not strictly a deliberate assault and battery.”
69
 
 
64 Millison, 501 A.2d at 510; see also Bryan v. Jeffers, 248 A.2d 129, 130 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1968) (“[T]he Legislature intended the words ‘intentional wrong,’ in this 
context, to have their commonly understood signification of deliberate intention.”). 
65 Millison, 501 A.2d at 514–15 (emphasis in original); see also Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 
894 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 80, at 569 
(5th ed. 1984) (emphasizing that “an intentional wrong is not limited to actions taken with a 
subjective desire to harm, but also includes instances where an employer knows that the 
consequences of those acts are substantially certain to result in such harm.”)). 
66 Millison, 501 A.2d at 510 (quoting 6–103 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF 
WORKMAN’S COMPENSATION § 103.03, at 13–22 to 13–27 (1983)). 
67 Millison, 501 A.2d at 513–14. 
68 Crippen v. Cent. Jersey Concrete Pipe Co., 823 A.2d 789, 795 (N.J. 2003) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
69 Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Constr. Co., 823 A.2d 769, 772 (N.J. 2003) (citing 
Millison, 501 A.2d at 513). 
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Rather, the “substantial certainty” standard is determinative.
70
 
The quid pro quo of workers’ compensation “can best be preserved 
by applying the ‘intent’ analysis of Dean Prosser to determine what is 
an ‘intentional wrong’ within the meaning” of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-
9.
71
 The meaning of intent is that an actor desires to cause the 
consequences of his act or is substantially certain that such 
consequences will result from his actions.
72
 The distinction between 
negligence, recklessness, and intent is a matter of degree; “the dividing 
line between negligent or reckless conduct on the one hand and 
intentional wrong on the other must be drawn with caution, so that the 
statutory framework of the Act is not circumvented simply because a 
known risk later blossoms into reality.”
73
 There must be “a virtual 
certainty.”
74
 
Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Company, Inc. involved a serious 
hand injury arising from the plaintiff’s use of an industrial rolling mill 
at his place of employment.
75
 Thirteen years prior to the plaintiff’s 
accident, his employer disabled a safety guard on the mill, replacing it 
in its proper position only when Occupational Safety Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) representatives visited the plant.
76
 Despite the 
employer’s knowledge of the dangerous condition, the plaintiff’s prior 
requests for reinstallation of the safety guard, and various “close calls” 
resulting from the removal of the guard, the employer refused to 
reinstall the guard, electing instead to forego the safety of its employees 
in favor of increased “speed and convenience.”
77
 The Laidlow court 
determined that a reasonable jury could find that, in light of such 
circumstances, the defendant-employer “knew that it was substantially 
certain that the removal of the safety guard would result eventually in 
 
70 Millison, 501 A.2d at 514 (quoting Keeton et al., supra note 67, § 8, at 36) (Relying 
upon The Law of Torts: “the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk—something short 
of substantial certainty—is not intent. The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness 
that the act is causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the 
risk is great, the conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not an 
intentional wrong.”). 
71 Id.  
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A. 
73 Millison, 501 A.2d at 514. 
74 Id. (citations omitted). 
75 Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 887. 
76 Id. at 888. 
77 Id. at 897. 
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injury to one of its employees.”
78
 The court made it clear that the 
absence of a prior accident did not preclude a finding of an intentional 
wrong.
79
 Thus, the court held that a jury question was presented as to the 
conduct prong of the Millison test.
80
 With regard to the context prong, 
the Laidlow court found that, “if an employee is injured when an 
employer deliberately removes a safety device from a dangerous 
machine to enhance profit or production, with substantial certainty that 
it will result in death or injury to a worker, and also deliberately and 
systematically deceives OSHA . . . such conduct violates the social 
contract” and falls outside the scope of the workers’ compensation bar.
81
 
While ordinarily the same set of facts and circumstances will be 
germane to both prongs, the conduct prong is a question of fact to be 
determined by a jury, while the context prong is question of law for the 
court.
82
 
V. The Position of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation 
Courts on Non-Economic Damages for Undocumented 
Workers Injured on the Job versus Non-access to Certain 
Economic Benefits
83
 
In the context of undocumented workers’ rights of access to courts 
generally for civil remedies, New Jersey courts have interpreted 
 
78 Id. at 897–98. 
79 Id. at 897 (citing Cook v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 657 N.E.2d 356, 364 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995)). 
80 Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 897–98. 
81 Id. at 898. The Court was careful to circumscribe its ruling, however, noting that it 
should not be understood to establish a per se rule that an “intentional wrong” is committed 
whenever a safety device is removed from machinery or some other OSHA violation is 
found. Id. Rather, what is necessary is the consideration of the “totality of the facts 
contained in the record and the satisfaction of the standards established in Millison and 
explicated here.” Id. See also Tomeo, 823 A.2d at 373, 384; Mull v. Zeta Computer Prods., 
823 A.2d 782, 786 (N.J. 2003); Crippen, 823 A.2d at 797–99. 
82 Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 898. 
83 In a related area of law, the New Jersey Department of Labor (“Department”) has 
been unmistakable in making immigration status a non-issue in its enforcement of the New 
Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”). The Department “[refuses to] investigate or 
inquire into the legal status of any worker[;] applies New Jersey’s labor laws without regard 
to a worker’s legal status; [and] does not share information with ‘Immigration.’” The 
Department’s position is supported by New Jersey courts, which have held that immigration 
status is immaterial to the enforcement of the state’s worker protections. Wage and Hour 
Disclaimer, N.J. DEP’T OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., 
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/wagehour/content/wage_and_hour_disclaimer.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013). 
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workers’ compensation benefits to be more like personal injury or 
contract remedies, to which all workers are entitled, and thus as distinct 
from other statutory economic payments, such as back pay and 
unemployment benefits. In a very pointed decision, New Jersey 
Appellate Judge Sylvia Pressler opined that workers’ compensation 
benefits are analytically distinct from economic payments, such as 
unemployment benefits, and specifically held that undocumented 
employees are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under the 
WCA.
84
 
The unavailability of economic payments to undocumented 
workers, such as unemployment compensation or back pay under the 
NLRA, does not mean that workers’ compensation is also unavailable to 
the same population.
85
 A claimant’s availability for work is a 
prerequisite for eligibility for unemployment compensation, and the 
Supreme Court interpreted the NLRA to essentially contain an identical 
prerequisite.
86
 Unlawfully present aliens are not qualified for 
unemployment compensation because they are prohibited by law from 
accepting employment at all.
87
 The rationale for prohibiting access to 
unemployment compensation and back pay are very similar: one cannot 
have a right to payment, which turns on gaining access to work one is 
not authorized to engage in. The Hoffman court held that one is not 
entitled to back payments for work he was not authorized to have in the 
first place.
88
 Similarly, one may not receive unemployment benefits 
“[s]ince an illegal alien is prohibited by law from accepting a new job, . 
. . [and therefore he] must be deemed unavailable for work, thus not 
temporarily unemployed and therefore not qualified for unemployment 
 
84 Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 225 (holding that “the right to workers’ compensation is as 
much an incident of the employment as the right to receive salary, and has been earned once 
the labor has been performed.”) Accord Fernandez-Lopez, Inc. v. Cervino, Inc., 671 A.2d 
1051, 1053 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15–36) (finding 
that, because “the term ‘employee’ is synonymous with servant”, the Act does not 
specifically exclude illegal aliens from recovery for injuries suffered on the job because the 
statutory definition of employee is “all natural persons . . . who perform service for an 
employer for financial consideration,” and explaining that IRCA does not pre-empt state 
workers’ compensation laws). Cf. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 
229–30 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that federal law does not preempt New York state law 
allowing injured undocumented workers to recover compensatory damages for lost 
earnings). 
85 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21–4(i)(1) (West 2013). 
86 § 43:21–4(c)(1); Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 144. 
87 § 43:21–4(c)(1). 
88 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–52. 
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compensation.”
89
 
Unlike the unemployment compensation system, which primarily 
has a prospective focus of seeing a worker through a temporary period 
of unemployment, the conceptual basis of the Workers’ Compensation 
system is the substitution of the statutory remedy for a common-law 
right of action, the statutory remedy becoming an integral component of 
the contract of employment.
90
 As such, workers’ compensation inhabits 
a legal landscape situated somewhere in between a statutory benefit and 
a civil legal remedy. New Jersey has found workers’ compensation to 
be more like a civil remedy in its role and purpose, and thus it should be 
accessible even to undocumented alien workers. 
Further, in New Jersey, the Workers’ Compensation system, unlike 
the unemployment compensation system, is not governmentally funded. 
Rather, it is primarily subsidized by employers’ insurance premiums or 
self-insurance funds.
91
 New Jersey courts have found that public policy 
is well served by causing the private sector to bear the responsibility for 
payment of workers’ compensation as it encourages employers to 
ensure workplace safety.
92
 
In Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., Judge Pressler opined 
that 
none of these predicates is in the least degree compromised by the 
eligibility of an injured illegal alien for workers’ compensation. 
Surely, the effect on the worker of his injury has nothing to do with 
his citizenship or immigration status. If his capacity to work has been 
diminished, that disability will continue whether his future 
employment is in this country or elsewhere. Moreover, his need for 
medical treatment and his right thereto as an incident of his 
employment do not derive from or depend upon his immigration 
status. They are, rather, a function of work he has actually performed 
during the course of which he sustained an injury.
93
 
There are fundamental reasons, in the absence of an express 
statutory bar, for according undocumented workers the benefit of the 
 
89 Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 224. 
90 See Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, Inc., 161 A.2d 479, 484 (1960). 
91 See Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 224 (citing Romanny v. Stanley Baldino Const. Co., 667 
A.2d 349, 351 (1995)).  
92 Eger v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 539 A.2d 1213, 1217 (1988); Stephenson v. 
R.A. Jones & Co., 510 A.2d 1161, 1173 (N.J. 1986) (Stein, J., dissenting). 
93 Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 224–25. 
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Workers’ Compensation laws.
94
 “‘[A] well established body of law 
holds that illegal aliens have rights of access to the courts and are 
eligible to sue therein to enforce contracts and redress civil wrongs such 
as negligently inflicted personal injuries.’”
95
 Workers’ compensation 
rests upon both contract and tort principles; the contract right in effect 
substitutes for the tort right an employee would otherwise have. 
“It would not only be illogical but it would also serve no 
discernible public purpose to accord illegal aliens the right to bring 
affirmative claims in tort for personal injury but to deny them the right 
to pursue the substitutionary remedy for personal injuries sustained in 
the workplace. . . .”
96
 New Jersey recognizes that, with respect to 
undocumented workers, “the sui generis nature of unemployment 
compensation and the considerations uniquely relevant to its 
administration are not transferrable to or in any way applicable to the 
alien’s right to prosecute personal injury claims.”
97
 Judge Pressler noted 
that a rule of law denying workers’ compensation to an undocumented 
worker is more likely to encourage, rather than to deter, employers to 
employ unlawfully present aliens.
98
 Such a rule would therefore disserve 
the public policy expressed by federal law. 
Most importantly, the Mendoza court observed, “[s]urely, the 
effect on the worker of his injury has nothing to do with his citizenship 
or immigration status. If his capacity to work has been diminished, that 
disability will continue whether his future employment is in this country 
or elsewhere.”
99
 
 
 
 
 
94 Id. at 225. 
95 Id. (quoting Montoya, 401 A.2d at 1103). 
96 Mendoza, 672 A.2d at 225. 
97 Id. at 248. 
98 Id. at 225 (“We also regard the desideratum of workplace safety enhanced by 
according workers’ compensation benefits to an illegal alien since an employer’s immunity 
from payment of compensation to that class of employees might well provide a disincentive 
to assuring workplace safety. Moreover, such an immunity from accountability might well 
have the further undesirable effect of encouraging employers to hire illegal aliens in 
contravention of the provisions and policies of the Immigration Reform and Control Act.”). 
99 Id. at 224. 
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CONCLUSION 
Undocumented alien workers in New Jersey are entitled to non-
economic benefits if they are injured on the job. They are not entitled to 
back pay or front pay because they are not lawfully entitled to work. 
Thus, providing access to workers’ compensation is not in conflict with 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the NLRA in light of the IRCA. 
The Supreme Court made clear that undocumented workers are not 
entitled to compensation solely for work in the United States in which 
they are not authorized to engage in the first instance. However, 
Workers’ Compensation in New Jersey is distinct from those facts. 
While it is a statutory scheme all the same, workers’ compensation is a 
legislative alternative for recovery in the courts under tort and contract 
principles. One need not have work authorization in the United States to 
bring those suits, and thus, in the words of Judge Pressler, it would be 
“illogical” to deny access to a legislated substitute remedy. New Jersey 
understands the limits of benefits to which undocumented workers have 
access—there are those benefits for which work authorization is a 
prerequisite and those for which it is not. One line that has been drawn 
to highlight this difference is the denial of unemployment benefits for 
undocumented alien workers, versus the grant of access to workers’ 
compensation. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Hoffman, New Jersey has held that one may not recover for lack of 
access to employment in which one is not authorized to partake, but one 
may utilize a statutory scheme to make one whole again where one has 
been injured in the course of employment. 
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APPENDIX: OVERVIEW OF STATE COURT RULINGS
100
 
California 
Farmers Bros. Coffee v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. 
Appeals Bd., No. B150724, 2002 WL 14515 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 
2002); Del Taco v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Foodmaker, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 
78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 
Colorado 
Champion Auto Body v. Indust. Claim Appeals Office of State of Colo., 
950 P.2d 671 (Colo. App. 1997). 
 
Connecticut 
Dowling v. Slotnick, 244 Conn. 781, 805 (Conn. 1998) (holding that 
undocumented workers are able to pursue remedies under the 
Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act). 
  
District of Columbia 
Marboah v. Ackerman, 877 A.2d 1052 (D.C. 2005). 
 
Florida 
Arreola v. Admin. Concepts, 17 So. 3d 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); 
Safeharbor Emp’r Svcs. I, Inc. v. Cinto Velazquez, 860 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Cenvill Dev. Corp. v. Candelo, 478 So. 2d 1168 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Gene’s Harvesting v. Rodriguez, 421 So.2d 
701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
 
Georgia 
Cont’l PET Techs., Inc. v. Palacias, 604 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2004); 
Earth First Grading v. Gutierrez, 606 S.E.2d 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); 
Wet Walls, Inc. v. Ledezma, 598 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); 
Dynasty Sample Co. v. Beltran, 479 S.E.2d 773 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
 
 
 
100 See generally Margaret A. Shield, Application of Workers Compensation Laws to 
Illegal Aliens, 121 A.L.R. 5TH 523 (2013). 
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Hawaii 
Gambalan v. Kekaha Sugar Co., 39 Haw. 258 (Haw. 1952). 
 
Illinois 
Econ. Packing Co. v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 901 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2008). 
 
Kansas 
Doe v. Kan. Dept. of Human Res., 90 P.3d 940 (Kan. 2004). 
 
Louisiana 
Rodriguez v. Integrity Contracting, 38 So. 3d 511 (La. Ct. App. 2010); 
Artiga v. M.A. Patout & Son, 671 So. 2d 1138 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 
Maryland 
Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 882 A.2d 817 (Md. 2005). 
 
Michigan 
Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. 2003). 
 
Minnesota 
Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 2003). 
 
Nebraska 
Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 778 N.W.2d 504 (Neb. Ct. App. 
2009). 
 
Nevada 
Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175 (Nev. 2001). 
 
New Hampshire 
Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1001 (N.H. 2005) 
(“Allowing recovery of lost wages under limited circumstances will not, 
in our opinion, bar enforcement of our Immigration laws.”). 
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New Jersey 
Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2004); 
Fernandez-Lopez v. Jose Cervino, Inc., 671 A.2d 1051 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
App. Div. 1996); Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d 221 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
 
New Mexico 
Gonzalez v. Performance Painting, Inc., 258 P.3d 1098 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2011). 
 
New York 
Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192–93 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (Hoffman did not apply to preclude an illegal alien’s claims under 
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for work already 
performed.); Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 25 A.D.3d 14, 26 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[N]o court has held, that an undocumented 
alien may be deprived of wages for work already performed.”); 
Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 69 A.2d 875, 876 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1979) (ruling that “the practice of hiring unlawfully present aliens, 
using their services and disclaiming any obligation to pay wages 
because the contracts were illegal is to be condemned”); Testa v. 
Sorrento Rest., Inc., 10 A.D.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); see also 
Amoah v. Mallah Mgmt., LLC, 57 A.D.3d 29, (N.Y. 2008);  
Ramroop v. Flexo-Craft Printing, Inc., 896 N.E.2d 69 (N.Y. 2008); 
Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application 
of Workers’ Compensation Provisions Relating to Nonresident Alien 
Dependents, 28 A.L.R. 5TH 547 (1995). 
 
North Carolina 
Roset-Eredia v. F.W. Dellinger, Inc., 660 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2008); Ruiz v. Belk Masonry Co., Inc., 559 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2002); Rivera v. Trapp, 519 S.E.2d 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
 
Oklahoma 
Lang v. Landeros, 918 P.2d 404 (O.K. Civ. App. 1996). 
 
Oregon 
Hernandez v. SAIF Corp., 35 P.3d 1099 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). 
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Pennsylvania 
DDP Contracting, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 826 A.2d 830 
(Pa. 2003); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 570 
Pa. 464, 810 A.2d 99 (Pa. 2002); Mora v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 
845 A.2d 950 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004); Morris Painting, Inc. v. 
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 814 A.2d 879 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). 
 
South Carolina 
Curiel v. Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 655 S.E.2d 482 (S.C. 2007). 
 
Tennessee 
Silva v. Martin Lumber Co., No. M2003-00490-WC-R3-CV, 2003 WL 
22496233 (Tenn. Special Workers’ Comp. App. Panel Nov. 5, 2003). 
 
Texas 
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App. 2003); 
Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635 
(Tex. App. 1972). 
 
Virginia 
Granados v. Windson Dev. Corp., 509 S.E.2d 290 (Va. 1999); Peterson 
v. Neme, 281 S.E.2d 869, 872 (Va. 1981) (holding that immigration 
status is “immaterial to Neme’s right to recover damages for lost 
wages”); Mendoza-Garcia v. Cho Yeon HWI/Best Cleaners, No. 1257-
00-4, 2001 WL 292316 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2001); Rios v. Ryan Inc. 
Cent., 542 S.E.2d 790 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); Alvarado v. Krajewski, No. 
0981-00-4, 2001 WL 15827 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2001); Billy v. Lopez, 
434 S.E.2d 908 (Va. Ct. App. 1993); Manis Const. Co. v. Arellano, 411 
S.E.2d 233 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). 
 
Wisconsin 
Arteaga v. Literski, 265 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Wis. 1978) (holding that 
undocumented immigrants have a right to sue in the courts of 
Wisconsin). 
 
Wyoming 
Felix v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 986 P.2d 161 
(Wyo. 1999). 
